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ABSTRACT
Darwin's Origin launched evolution into theoretical orbit and it continues to influence its course. 
This magnum opus detailed a tenable solution to the most fundamental problem of human existence, 
and although this  Promethean vision contains  a  few minor errors, there is  one nontrivial  error 
which misguides several crucial developments – not only in the evolving structure of evolutionary 
theory, but across the entire spectrum of science, including politico-economics.  This problem has 
led  theorists  to  mistakenly  favour  earth-based  inputs  over  cosmic  inputs,  to  over-emphasize 
biological evolution, and to under-emphasize stellar evolution.  These perceptive, methodological, 
and  logical  errors  have, in  turn, emphasized  the  significance  of  the  individual “struggle  against 
competitors” over the  cooperative “struggle against inclement environments”, and thus fashionable 
theories relating to Global Warming,  The Problem of Sustainable Economic Development, and The Tragedy of  
the Commons have been erected upon false and sandy foundations and suggest evolutionarily unstable 
solutions.  And to this point, in light of the discoveries presented here, we conclude that largely 
redirected  global  threat  mitigation  efforts  will  require  unprecedented  levels  of  international 
cooperation if long-term human survival is to be achieved.
£ matt@funkisland.org
$ The author would like to thank Ben Funk and Liongate Capital Management for sponsoring my researches into the 
natural history of Mustique, SVG during 2008 and 2009.  The theory presented here could not have been written 
without their generosity and support.
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§1.  INTRODUCTION
On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of the Favoured Nations in the  
Struggle for Life (1) was published 150 years ago, in November of 1859, and – with De Re Militari (2), 
On the Revolutions of Heavenly Spheres (3), Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy (4), A Treatise of  
Human Nature (5), An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (6), Common Sense (7),  An 
Essay on the Principle of Population (8), Two Lectures on the Checks to Population (9), Personal Narrative (10), 
Cosmos (11), On the Law which has Regulated The Introduction of New Species (12), The Gettysburg Address  
(cf 13), A Dynamical Theory of the Electromagnetic Field (14), Sailing Alone Around the World (15),£ ten 
Annalen der Physik briefs (16-25), The Winning of the West (26), The Economic Consequences of the Peace 
(27), Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour (28), The Second World War (29) Non-Cooperative Games (30), 
The Logic of Scientific Discovery (31), Molecular Structure of Nucleic Acids (32), Island Biology (33), The  
Pretense of Knowledge (34), The Constitution of Liberty (35), a 1987 issue of Woman's Own (36), The Process  
and Progress of Economics (37), Evolution and the Theory of Games (38), The Structure of Evolutionary Theory  
(39),  What Makes Biology Unique (40), War and Peace (41), and Failure is Not an Option (42)$ – glimmers 
amongst our most brilliant illuminations, most valuable problem-solving tools, and most 
informative sources for long-term human survival strategies.
     As a Fellow of the biological society where Darwin and Wallace devoted much of their efforts 
(43) and announced their revolutionary discovery (44), it may come of little surprise that I hold the 
Origin in high regard (cf S1).  Furthermore, I concur that the Origin
exceeds all other scientific ‘classics’ of past centuries in immediate and continued relevance to 
the  basic  theoretical  formulation  and  debates  of  current  practitioners.  Careful  exegesis  of 
Darwin’s logic and intentions, through textual analysis of the Origin, therefore assumes unusual 
importance for the contemporary practice of science (39, p 58).
     Which is exactly why it is critical why I must bring the grave nature of the Origin's most 
significant error to light.
     This task would not be nearly so difficult if it were not for the fact that much that we believe 
today has “been so thoroughly muddled by Plato and Aristotle, whose influence has given rise to 
such deep-rooted prejudices that the prospect of dispelling them does not seem very bright” (45, p 
9), but  I will try, including a rough sketch of three intellectual obstacles which invariably block the 
doorway to these illusive truths.  Presently, we'll consider the most formidable issue; the others are 
briefly noted in §3. 
£ Joshua Slocum was the first man to sail around the world in a small boat with none but himself as captain, mate and 
crew. Other men may repeat the feat. No other man can be the first….  He wrote of his ship and his voyage, and it never 
occurred to him that in doing so he was forging a bond between the English whose blood was in his veins and the 
Americans under whose flag he was proud to circumnavigate the world….
    Slocum was born in Nova Scotia in 1844.... He was eight years old when his family moved to Briar’s Island and he left 
school and was put to work on the farm. At the age of twelve he was caught making a ship model in the cellar where he  
should have been grading potatoes, was given a beating, saw his model smashed and ran away from home. For the next  
few years he earned a living for himself, as cook, ship’s boy and what not, among the fishermen on the Bay of Fundy. At  
the age of sixteen he and a friend sailed before the mast in a full-rigged ship from St. John’s [sic], New Brunswick, to 
Dublin. We next hear of him as an ordinary seaman in a British ship, sailing from England to China. He went down with 
fever and was left in a hospital at Batavia. There he made a very good friend in Captain Airy of the S.S. Soushay. He left 
Batavia in the Soushay, and in that vessel voyaged at many far-eastern ports. He can have lost no opportunity of educating 
himself, for at eighteen he was promoted to second mate. He twice rounded the Horn in British ships (15).
$ We had not anticipated what happened back then, on Earth.... In fact, it would be hours before we really understood 
what had happened.... [But] what we could not accomplish through technology, or procedures and operating manuals, 
we might be able to manage by drawing on a priceless fund of experience, accumulated over almost a decade of sending  
men into places far beyond the envelope of Earth's protective, nurturing atmosphere.... These three astronauts were 
beyond our physical reach. But not beyond the reach of human imagination, inventiveness, and a creed that we all lived 
by: 'Failure is not an option' (42, p 12).
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      The most menacing gargoyle is teleology.  
     Several methodological issues make it rather difficult to ascertain how little or much to say about 
this big problem, so I will merely offer a brief definition [“any processes that ‘persist toward an end 
point under varying conditions’ or in which ‘the end state of the process is determined by its 
properties at the beginning’” (40, p 49)], refer the curious to a more illustrative contextual 
reference (cf 40, pp 39- 41), and restrict focus to aspects most relevant to the problem at hand:
Natural  selection  does  not  guarantee  the  power  of  adaptation  in  all  circumstances,  and  if 
environments change rapidly and profoundly enough, these alterations may exceed the power of 
adaptation by natural selection, with extinction of most forms as the expected result, even in the 
most strictly Darwinian of circumstances...
    Darwin’s hostility to catastrophic mass extinction does not arise primarily from threats posed 
to the mechanism of natural selection itself, but more from the challenges raised by the prospect 
of sudden global change to the key… assumption that observable processes at work in modern 
populations  can,  given  the  amplitude  of  geological  time,  render  the  full  panoply  of 
macroevolutionary results by prolonged accretion and accumulation.
The  problem  of  mass  extinction  became  acute  for  Darwin  because  geological  paroxysm 
threatened  something  quite  particular,  vitally  important,  and  therefore  of  much  greater 
immediate pith and moment than his general methodological preference for locating all causality 
in  the  palpable  observation  of  microevolution…  Global  catastrophe  could  undermine  the 
ecological  argument  that  Darwin  had  so  carefully  devised…  to  validate  something  more 
particular but no less important: his culture’s central belief in progress...
     To explain the general pattern of life’s history, Darwin sought to extrapolate the results of 
competition  ordained  by  the  immediacies  of  natural  selection  in  ecological  moments.   In 
particular…, to argue that most competition, in a world chock full of species, unfolds in the 
biotic mode of direct battle for limited resources, mano a mano so to speak, and not in the abiotic 
mode of struggle to survive in difficult physical conditions. If struggle by... battle (which favors 
mental and biomechanical improvement) trumps struggle against inclement environment (which 
often favors cooperation rather than battle…), then a broad vector of progress should pervade 
the history of life (39, pp 1298-1299).
But of course the fossil record has clearly demonstrated that this is not the case; and thus Darwin’s 
need to cater to the teleological worldview of the Victorian era has generated grave and, alas, very 
long-lasting consequences.  
     This seemingly minor flaw in this magnificent foundational work has spawned a grave and 
unintended consequences: the gross underestimation of the global (not to mention national) threats 
presented by cosmic inputs. It has also obscured our dire need for cooperation (planetary threat 
mitigation efforts) at the global level.  
     I outlined these crucial points (46), and enclosed this brief communiqué in a long letter (S1),
but as the exposition of the entire group of considerations would be rather difficult to follow, 
only a few quite elementary reflexions will be given in the following pages, from which the 
reader will readily be able to inform himself as to the suppositions of the theory and its line of 
thought (24, p 898).
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§2.  ON DARWIN'S NONTRIVIAL ERROR
The 150th anniversary of the Origin and the 200th celebration of Darwin's birth have generated both 
praise and critical reassessments of Darwin's works and methodology.  To date, criticisms appear to 
have largely recounted trivial errors (e.g., 47).
     However, in order “to enhance the implausibility of truly catastrophic mass dying, Darwin holds 
that ‘the complete extinction of the species of a group is generally a slower process than their 
production” (1, p 318, as cited in 39, p 1300).   This nontrivial error leaves us increasingly 
vulnerable to mass extinction.  Darwin confessed, “Scarcely any... discovery is more striking than 
the fact, that the forms of life change almost simultaneously throughout the world” (1, p 322). And 
in pages 317-318 he had falsely concluded that
this impression must be an artefact produced by the markedly incomplete preservation of more 
gradual and continuous change in a woefully imperfect geological record... ‘The old notion of all 
the inhabitants of the earth having been swept away at successive periods by catastrophes is very 
generally given up, even by those geologists… whose general views would naturally lead them to 
this conclusion. On the contrary, we have every reason to believe, from the study of the tertiary 
formations, that species and groups of species gradually disappear, one after the other, first from 
one spot, then from another, and finally from the world.’ (1, p 302, as cited in 39, p 1301).
This error continues to misguide science and pop-culture:
In particular, these… assumptions about the extended duration of apparent mass extinctions led 
geologists and palaeontologists to favour earth-based rather than cosmic physical inputs…, and 
to focus upon telluric influences (like changing climates and sea levels) that could most easily be 
rendered as gradualistic in style. So strongly entrenched did this prejudice remain, even spilling 
over into popular culture as well, that a few years after Alvarez et al.  published their plausible, 
and  by then  increasingly  well  affirmed, scenario  of  extraterrestrial  impact  as  a  catastrophic 
trigger for the Cretaceous-Tertiary  event, the  New York Times even ridiculed the idea in  their 
editorial pages, proclaiming… that ‘terrestrial events, like volcanic activity or changes in climate 
or sea level, are the most immediate possible cause of mass extinctions. Astronomers should 
leave to astrologers the task of seeking the cause of earthly events in the stars’ (39, p 1303).
If the problem at hand is not clear by now, please consider  an extraordinary new book:  The Cosmic  
Connection: How Astronomical Events Impact Life on Earth (48):
Our ascendancy as a species is usually credited to Darwinian processes, such as passing along 
traits from one generation to the next, genetic mutations that improve an organism's chances of 
survival, successful  adaptations  of  organisms  to  different  regions  or  environments, and  the 
flourishing of  one species  of  another.  Nevertheless, evolution is  not enough to  explain  the 
ascension of the human race on this amazing planet. In its most sweeping terms, life also results 
from conditions not of our world but of our universe (48, p 10).
     Indeed, social and biological sciences place undue emphasis upon very recent events – the social 
sciences find a great deal of significant data in the past few centuries, and the biological sciences find 
a great deal of significant data over evolutionary time, but, in reality, the Earth has experienced 
almost no significant cosmic events (and thus we find almost no truly useful data) in the course of 
Hominid evolution.  
     For example the  “asteroid the size of Mount Everest” (48, p 12) that splashed down along the 
coast of the Yucatán peninsula, resulting in the complete extinction of 70% of terrestrial life 
(including 100% of the dinosaurs) and 96% of all marine life, does, to be certain, represent one of 
the most significant events in natural history and therefore one of the most valuable pieces data on 
Earth – but neither economics, contemporary theorists, politicians, nations, nor popular culture are 
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much concerned with this 'outlier'.  And, once again, this is problematic, to say the least because
knowing how astronomical influences have shaped our world and enabled the human race to 
evolve and flourish gives us a unique perspective on the nature and direction of life on Earth and 
the possibility of life on other planets (48, p 13).
“Mass extinctions are more frequent, more rapid, more intense, and more different in their effects 
than... Darwinian biology could permit” (39, p 1312-1313), and this has had profound effects upon 
all sciences and politico-economic development strategies.  To paraphrase J.B.S. Haldane (49), one 
does not have to be a profound realist to realise that consistently underestimating the probability of 
mass extinction finds favour with those clinging to teleological comforts, and creates serious 
problems for those who endeavour to develop and deploy evolutionarily stable strategies.
     And to make matters worse, those able-minded theorists who possess the courage and take the 
time to patiently offer these unfashionable perspectives are invariably ignored or ridiculed.  One 
such individual, Milutin Milankovitch, quietly pointed out that the Earth's axis is not fixed, but 
rather oscillates over a 41,000 year cycle, an oscillation which appears to have been (and continues to 
be) the greatest long-term influence of climate change (48).  And, like many misunderstood 
visionaries, “Milankovitch was certainly on to something when practically everyone else thought he 
was not” (48, p 38).
     How was it that he was able to see something so clearly which so many others could not?  By simply 
adopting the universal worldview necessary to grasp the discovery illuminated here.
Milankovitch did not merely see the Earth and its sediments; he saw the Earth in space and in 
motion around the Sun over the course of millions of years.  It took uncanny vision to step off 
the Earth and look back from a distance of 100 million miles and watch cogs turn, then forge a... 
connection... It was the same kind of vision possessed by people like Agassiz, Adhemar, Croll, 
and Wegener, some of whom paid a high price to see worlds, possibilities, and connections that 
others could, or would, not (48, p 28).
     Although it is true that “nothing makes sense in biology except in the light of evolution” (50, p 
449), that nothing on Earth (or elsewhere in the universe) makes sense except in the light of galactic 
evolution is a more significant truth:
Look anywhere beyond our little nook of Galaxy and you will see a universe that is not only 
dispassionate, but dangerous and random.  Comets plough into planets.  Stars explode without 
regard to what clinging forms of life may be in the vicinity.  Black holes suck up space and time 
at will (48, p 63).
     At least one writer (51) has suggested we will never accomplish interstellar travel; but as an 
optimistic£ problem-solver focused upon survival, your author has hope that where there is a will, 
there is a way.
     Furthermore, in essence, this pessimistic prophecy has already been falsified: we have, essentially, 
been travelling in such a manner for the past ≈13 billion years:  Our planet – along with the rest of our 
solar system – is speeding through interstellar space at 12 miles per second “in the direction of the 
constellation Hercules, southwest of the bright star Vega and just north of the billowy clouds of the 
summer Milky Way” (48, p 162).
£ Yes, despite all this I remain an optimist toward the world. It is one’s duty to be an optimist. Only from this point of 
view can one be active and do what one can. If you are a pessimist, you have given up. We must remain optimists, we 
have to look at the world from the point of view of how beautiful it is, and to try to do what we can to make it better 
(52, p 48).
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§3.  DISCUSSION
What logical implications follow from these profound and illusive truths?  What are the implications for the  
advancement of science? National security? Human survival?
     In general, we may wish to start thinking more clearly about the road ahead, being mindful of 
obstacles we may wish to try to avoid or prepare to meet.
     But this would require – amongst a myriad of inter-connected issues – the complete recognition 
and wide adoption of Sir Karl Popper's remarkable solution (31) to David Hume's Problem of  
Induction (5).  I've written on this  topic at length (46 ; S1) and brilliant thinkers from Hayek (34-35) 
to Hawking (53) have testified as well, but there's little to indicate we're willing to relinquish our 
“intense desire for assured knowledge” (54, p 22) and teleological fairytales; it seems our disdain for 
realism and affection for the Pretense of Knowledge (34) remains so strong that we'd rather be Fooled by  
Randomness (55) and commit ourselves to near-certain extinction than face these difficult and 
disquieting truths (extinction would remain a high probability even if we were thinking clearly, 
strategizing, and acting accordingly).  Clear thinking about this problem would also require the wide 
recognition of a key deduction by a gifted problem-solver “regularly credited with being one of the 
two most important logicians of the twentieth century” (56):  Economic power is derivative, not 
primary (57 ; cf. 13). 
     But, like the perverse effect of the welfare state (58), this is yet another unfashionable truth 
which most would prefer not to acknowledge.  Indeed, the inter-related problems which stem from 
Darwin's Nontrivial Error are far-reaching, yet we must confine ourselves to brief examples. 
Consider, for example, that growing legions of ideological environmentalists and an entire ‘school’ 
of economics (so-called ‘ecological economics’) have failed to recognize the existence, much less the 
significance, of cosmic inputs.  In fact, (46) swings such a heavy wrecking-ball through so many 
widely-held and wildly popular theories (e.g., 59-60) that it will certainly face fierce resistance,£ 
and, as Edward De Bono once conjectured, it is possible that these unfashionable ideas “can only be 
expressed in book form” (61, p 31); and thus, Fortune willing, a big book carrying a simple, 
straight-forward message – one long argument – is on the way (cf S1, pp 65-67).  
     But for now let's consider the manner in which (46) falsifies the central thesis of ‘ecological 
economics’ (and hip-checks ideological environmentalism to the boards) – a refutation which is 
quite unnecessary – for it is quite unnecessary to falsify a ‘subject’ which does not exist (cf  S1, pp 
80-81), yet some readers may insist.
     So, consider the flimsy central thesis, as postulated by Herman E. Daly:
The facts are plain and uncontestable: the biosphere is finite, nongrowing, closed  (except for the 
constant input of solar energy), and constrained by the laws of thermodynamics. Any subsystem, 
such  as  the  economy,  must  at  some  point  cease  growing  and  adapt  itself  to  a  dynamic 
equilibrium, something like a steady state (62, p 101).
     But are the facts plain and uncontestable?
     Is the biosphere closed?  Is solar energy a constant input? (cf 48).  Is solar energy the sole ‘cosmic 
input’ to consider? 
     I’m afraid school is officially in session for Professor Daly and his fashionable and influential 
colleagues, because the well confirmed existence of a wide variety of chaotic ‘cosmic inputs’ 
£ I suppose the process of acceptance will pass through the usual four stages:
      1.  This is worthless nonsense,
      2.  This is an interesting, but perverse, point of view,
      3.  This is true, but quite unimportant,
      4.  I always said so (49, p. 464).
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demonstrates the false and sandy foundation that the central thesis of ecological economics was 
founded upon (45).  Alas, the Earth has not, nor ever will be in equilibrium or steady state, as the 
problem of induction renders these states indeterminable (45).
   But problems associated with the nontrivial problem at hand are certainly not limited to this 
popular branch of economics.  In fact, sampling the most influential scientific journals (63) at 
random testifies to near-universal error.  For example, a review of Science's 'top articles of last 
month' reveals that, yet-again, Garret Hardin's 1968 Tragedy of the Commons (64) is counted amongst 
them, and very little literature review is required to conclude that this paper remains arguably the 
single-most influential paper in science today. However, setting aside the fact that the citation itself, 
'(64)', is incorrect (65), as the logical implications which follow from the truths presented here 
falsify this highly influential theory; although this discourse is restricted to elementary reflexions, 
exhaustive indirect proofs (45 ; S1) and On the Travesty of the Tragedy of the Commons: Hardin's Nontrivial  
Error (65) may clarify this recent discovery; further reflexions on this refutation yield a bountiful 
harvest of related revelations, including the falsification of the findings of a 2009 Sveriges Riksbank  
Prize winner.  Although detailed considerations remain outside the scope of this discourse, a review 
of collected works (66-76) reveals systemic errors, faulty perceptions, and false conclusions.  And 
this is, in large part, due to the fact that these faulty perceptions and methodological errors are the 
norm, not the exception:
When we look at the world around us we see (if we are attentive enough) what is actually there, 
even if what is actually there is not the same as what we expected to see there. When we turn 
our attention from the world around us to the world of possibilities that we can imagine with 
our minds, however, perception does not work nearly so well.  We often fail to see the obvious 
until it is too late or until somebody else sees it and points it out to us. And very often something 
that we think is the case is not the case at all (77, p xiii).
     Ostrom's researches (66-76) were derived through the inductive analysis of data relating to 
incomplete perceptions of various 'commons' problems around the world£ and inherently flawed by 
the inability to imagine the serious possibilities presented by cosmic inputs, and, to be fair, our 
prizewinner is not alone, it seems the implications which follow from this problem remain largely 
unknown to all but your author. 
     Although several aspects of the methodological errors at hand (i.e., 59-60; 62 ; 64 ; 66-76) are 
are well-known, they remain wholly uncorrected (e.g., 78):
We have always depended on analysis not only to solve problems but also for our source of new 
ideas. Most people in education, science, business and economics still believe that the analysis of 
data will give us all the new ideas that we need. Unfortunately, this is not so. The mind can see 
only what it is prepared to see. That is why after a breakthrough in science we look back and find 
that all the needed evidence was available a long time before but could be seen only through the 
old idea (61, p 23).
£ Ostrom... has challenged the conventional wisdom that common property is poorly managed and should be completely 
privatized or regulated by central authorities. Based on numerous studies of user-managed fish stocks, pastures, woods, 
lakes, and  groundwater  basins, Ostrom concluded  that  the  outcomes  are  often  better  than  predicted  by  standard 
theories. The perspective of these theories was too static to capture the sophisticated institutions for decisionmaking and 
rule enforcement that have emerged to handle conflicts of interest in user-managed common pools around the world. 
By  turning  to  more  recent  theories  that  take  dynamics  into  account, Ostrom  found  that  some  of  the  observed 
institutions could be well understood as equilibrium outcomes of repeated games. However, other rules and types of 
behavior  are  difficult  to  reconcile  with  this  theory, at  least  under  the  common assumption that  players  are  selfish 
materialists who only punish others when it is their own interest. In field studies and laboratory experiments individuals’ 
willingness to punish defectors appears greater than predicted by such a model. These observations are important not 
only to the study of natural resource management, but also to the study of human cooperation (78, pp 1-2).
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     Indeed, almost all of the truths presented here were known to us prior to the publication of the 
Origin in 1859 (1), but alas, this is the process and progress of science (37).
     Yes, our planet is a precious resource which we must endeavour to protect – but it is also a 
depreciating asset which we must eagerly and voraciously consume in order to survive, and, given the 
game-theoretical framework presented in (46), we must assume a depreciation schedule of ≈50,000 
years.  In brief, our struggle to protect this asset must be balanced with a recognition that we have 
quite rightly been consuming (and must continue to consume) this resource in our resource-
intensive quests for threat mitigation technologies (fission, fusion, spacecraft, weapons, telescopes, 
asteroid tugboats, gravity tractors, alternative food sources, underground/undersea human habitats, 
etc.) to help extend the shelf-life of the Earth and the life-span of the human species, and, moreover, 
to ultimately facilitate our  search for another world (ultra long-distance dispersal, cf 46).  
     This new concept – ultra-long distance dispersal – happens to represent another intellectual 
(conceptual) obstacle which threatens to thwart our efforts here. Although Hawking champions this 
strategy (e.g., 79), few others eagerly second this motion.
     This may in part be due to the fact that, given Darwin's Error, with the notable exception of 
Sherwin Carlquist's revolutionary insights (cf 80-82), theorists have also largely failed to recognized 
the central role of long-distance dispersal in the evolutionary process; and this brings us to a brief 
reflexion on the third obstacle which threatens to obliterate the truly inconvenient truths sketched 
here from the light of day: the manifold and intrenched problems associated with specialization...
The specialization of science is an inevitable accompaniment of progress; yet it is full of dangers, 
and it is cruelly wasteful, since so much that is beautiful and enlightening is cut off from most of 
the world.  Thus it is proper to the role of the scientist that he not merely find new truths and 
communicate it  to  his  fellows, but that  he teach, that  he  try  to bring the most  honest  and 
intelligible account of new knowledge to all who will  try to learn (83, pp 138-139 ; cf 45).
And thus we have reached the crux of this difficult climb.  Oppenheimer estimated that scientists 
may make up about “one one-hundredth of a percent” of the human population (83, p 94), and, to 
make matters worse, as  Dawkins often notes, everybody thinks they understand evolutionary theory 
– yet few truly do.  
     Furthermore, due to previous commitments (mostly religious commitments), many able-minded 
scientists reject evolutionary theory outright,  and, just when it seems the  intellectual climate could 
be no worse, it turns out our 150 year-old nontrivial error in the foundational base of evolutionary 
theory has generated countless and unquantifiable errors throughout the scientific and political 
worlds.
We prefer to put our trust  in evolution. This  is  because evolution is  gradual  and allows the 
pressure of needs, values, reactions and events to mould ideas. It allows the shaping force of 
criticism. Bad ideas will die. Good ideas will survive and become even better. We really like the 
method of evolution because it fits our traditional thinking habits.  Change has its own energy 
and we can modify and control this by the use of our critical faculties because criticism is the 
basis of our thinking tradition....
     In spite of these excellent reasons for preferring and trusting evolution, there is a serious flaw 
in... evolutionary [theory] (61, p 19).
If this communique is intelligible to <.01% of the world, what are our true prospects for survival? 
99.99% of all species that have ever inhabited the Earth are extinct; the average species lifespan is 2 
Mya.  How do we communicate the logical implications and profound truths which follow from 
these findings in our fossil record?  How many will grasp that evolutionary stable global threat 
mitigation efforts would require a fundamental redirection of contemporary politico-economic 
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development strategies and unprecedented levels of international cooperation? ”Studies of mass 
extinctions tend to emphasize the sheer scope of the carnage.  But the subtle differences between 
the species that died and those that survived can be crucial” (84, p 122).   With this thought in mind, 
I will sign off with the closing remark from a talk given at Princeton in 1953:
Research is action; and the question I want to leave in a very raw and uncomfortable form with 
you is  how to communicate this  sense of action to our fellow men who are not destined to 
devote their lives to the professional pursuit of new knowledge (83, p 129).
Mustique, November, 2009£
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